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In this paper a structural model of job choice, labour supply and wages is
developed. The analysis is carried out in a neoclassical framework and the
restrictions implied by microeconomic theory are imposed.
An individual is assumed to maximize a utility function with leisure,
nonpecuniary job characteristics and consumption as arguments. Moreover it
is assumed that one's wage depends on human capital variables and the
characteristics of the job actually chosen. As a result the wage rate is
endogenous.
We simultaneously estimate labour supply, the demand for job
characteristics and the wage equation, taking into account that job
characteristics are qualitative variables.
The results suggest that there is a wage premium on the jobs with bad
characteristics-1-
1. Introduction
'1'he major objective of this paper is to develop a model of job choice,
wages and labour supply, and to use this model to estimate the magnitude
of the compensating wage differentials for qualitative differences in jobs
(such as pleasentness, riskiness, dirtiness etc.).
'1'lie theory of compensating wage differentials refers to observed wage
diFferentials required to equalize monetary and nonmonetary compensation
associated with different jobs. The theory can be used to explain the
allocation of workers to labour activities that differ in various attri-
butes, such as quality of the working environment. Activities that offer
favourable working conditions attract labour at lower than average wage
rates, and jobs offering unfavourable working conditions must pay a pre-
mium, as a compensation, to attract workers.
Most prior empirical work on compensating wage differentials has been
based on the estimation of a single wage equation ( cf~ Hamermesh[19~7],
Duncan[19~6]). One major disadvantage of these studies ~s that information
on labour supply is neglected. Since we believe that the labour supply
decision is taken jointly with the choice of a particular job and its
associated wage, it is essential that this information is incorporated in
the analysis. Analyses that ignore the (self) selection of individuals
into different occupations, may produce misleading results. Only in a few
papers a model is developed in which labour supply, job choice and the
determir~ation of wages are analysed jointly. F~camples are Atrostic[1982],
Zimmeiman[198~] and Killingsworth[1984]. Killingsworth developed a model
of labour supply and discrete job choice, and used it in an empirical
ana.lysis of the compensating wage differential between white and blue
collar work. This approach is slightly different from ours, since we con-
sider the joint determination of labour supply and a continuous job char-
acteristic.
Jobs with qualitative differences can be interpreted as differentiated
products, described by a vector of objectively measurable characteristics.
The observed product price ( this is the wage rate if we are dealing with
the labour market) and the amounts of characteristics define a set of-z-
implicit or hedonic prices (in our case the prices of job characteris-
Lics). See for example Rosen[19~4], or Brown and Rosen[1982].
In t}iis study it is assumed that an individual maximizes a utili.ty
f'unction with leisure, a nonpecuniary job characteristic and consumption
as its arguments. Nonpecuniary job characteristics are defined as nonmone-
tary benefits accruing to individuals as a consequence of their particular
occupation (e.g. working condítions). Notice that in this model job choice
is not discrete.
One's wage is assumed to depend on human capital variables and the
characteristics of the job chosen. The idea behind this relation is that
t}ie rewards for working can be both pecuniary (money wage) and nonpecuni-
ary (compensation by means of desirable job characteristics). In fact
employees sell the services of their labour, but simultaneously purchase
utility bearing job characteristics. Employers purchase the services of
labour., and jointly sell job characteristics. The observed relation be-
tween wages, human capital of the employee and job characteristics is
determined by the market in such a way that employees and employers are
matched correctly. For example, assume that individuals have homogeneous
preferences for different kinds of work, say all individuals dislike dirty
work. Furthermore assume there is a continuum of jobs, then if there is no
wage differential between dirty and clean jobs, nobody will be working in
dirty jobs. So individuals working in jobs with undesirable characteris-
tics have to be paid extra.
By including a job characteristic in the wage equation, the wage rate
becomes endogenous. Demand functions for leisure and job characteristics
are derived by applying Roy's Identity to the indirect utility function.
A common problem in the literature on job characteristics is the mea-
surement of job characteristics. In most studies a single, composite,
measure of job characteristics is constructed from responses to a series
of questions (cf. Atrostic[1982]). This approach assumes that those res-
ponses are commensurable. In this paper only one, objectively measurable,
job cliaracteristic is taken into consideration. In principle it is pos-
sible to extend the model by considering more than one job characteristic
at a time, but this complicates the estimation of the model quite a bit.-3-
The most important contribution of this paper is the formulation of a
model of job choice and labour supply, that is consistent with neoclassi-
c~l theor,y and that can be tested empirically.
In Section 2 a simultaneous model of job choice, labour supply and
wages is developed. In Section 3 the data are described and estimation
results are presented. Finally, in Section 4 some concluding remarks are
given.-4-
2. The model
As a convenicnt framework to present the basic ideas, we adopt the home
production approach to the theory of consumption, which takes goods and
services as inputs in a production process that generates utility bearing
outputs usually called "commodities" (cf. Becker[1965], Lancaster[1966],
Gronau[1986]). Let Zi be the quantity of commodity i and let the produc-
tion of each commodity require a combination of time inputs Tj (j-1,..,p)
and goods Xl (1-1,..,n):
Zi - fi(Xi,..,Xn.Tl . ..Tp), i-1,..,m. (1)
Here Xi is the amount of the 1-th good used in the production of the i-th
commodity and T~ is the amount of the j-th time input used in the produc-
tion of the i-th commodity; fi is the production function of the i-th
commodity. The utility function is:
~(Z1,..,Zm). (2)
The total number of goods and the total number of time inputs used in the
production of all commodities jointly are respectively:
}{1 - F X1 , 1-1,..,n (3)
i
T. - ï Tl ,
~ i ~
j-1...,p. (4)
Let unearned income of the individual (or household) be equal to u and
assume for simplicity that the individual can hold only one paid job; the
amount of time spent on the job is TP. Restrictions on behaviour are:
F p1X1 - u 4 w(q)TP
1
(5)
where w(q) is the wage rate and-5-
(6)
where T is the total time endowment. The wage rate corresponding to a job
depend~ on a vector q of job characteristics. For the moment we take q as
given.
In principle, behaviour follows from maximization of (2) subject to
(1), (3), (4), (5), (6). It has been noted by various authors (e.g. Pollak
and Wachter[1975]) that without further assumptions and without informa-
t~on about commodities, this model cannot be distinguished from a model in
which titility is defined directly in terms of goods and time inputs. Exam-
ples vf papers with specific implications are Gronau[1977,1980] and Graham
and Greene[1984].
In this paper we consider a static model in which relative prices of
consumption goods are constant across consumers. Furthermore, the struc-
ture of the production functions fi is as follows:
Zi - fi(Xi,..,Xn,Ti,...TP, q), i-1,..,m. (7)
The vector q appears in the production function because we want to allow
for ttie possibility that at least some commodities are being influenced by
the type of the job one is holding. An example might be that a commodity
is an amenity of a job and that the job characteristic q describes the
working conditions of the job. In this paper it is assumed that q is one-
dimensional.
Given that relative prices of consumption goods are assumed to be constant
across consumers, perfect aggregation over goods is possible. Similarly,
we can aggregate the time inputs T1,..,Tp-1 perfectly. Denote the aggre-
gate of the consumer goods by c, the aggregate of the first p-1 time in-
puts by 1 arid let h:- Tp. If we are only interested in three commodities,
namely ].eisure (Z1), an amenity of a job (Z2) and consumption (Z3), we can
then, without loss of generality, restrict our attention to the following
maximization problem:
max. u(zl,z2,z3) (8)
s.t. pcc - w(q)h . u (9)-6-
- fi(c.l,q), i-1.2,3.
Wc: a~;s,ume th,ct the production Functions fl and f3 are trivial, that is
Z1- 1
7.3- c.
For f2 we take a simple, multiplicative, specification, namely
Z2 - (T-1)q.




w - a'k t bq (14)
where k.- vector of individual characteristics
a, b are parameters.
The variable q is assumed to be a continuous variable. Equation (14)
reflects the fact that the wage rate is dependent on individual charac-
teristics, such as age and education, as well as on job characteristics
such as working conditions. If q is defined as a"good", the expected sign
of b is negative. For, a job with desirable job characteristics must be
paid less than a job with undesirable job characteristics, according to
the equalizing wage differentials literature. The parameter b can be in-
terpreted as a compensating wage differential.
Combining equations (8),(9),(11),(12),(13) and (14), the utility maxi-
mization problem can be written as follows:
max U(Z1,Z2,Z3)
s.t. Z1 - 1
Z2 - (T-1)q (15)
z3-c
pcc -(a'k t bq).(T-1) t u.-~-
The output level of commodity ZZ (to be interpreted as an amenity of a
job) ~loes not only depend on the type of job one is holding with asso-
ciated characteristic q, but also on the number of hours one is working.
'I'he interpretation oF this specification is the following: The disutility
derived from working only a few hours in an unpleasant job is less than
t,he disutility of working a lot of hours in the same job. In this inter-
pretation both Z2 and q are closely connected with working. If you don't
work, then q no longer affects utility. Hours of work affect utility
through two channels. Assuming that both Z2 and q are valued positively,
more liours of work yield more utility, if one is working in a nice type of
job. On the other hand, more hours oF work means less leisure time and
thus less uti-lity. If q is less than zero, that is, one is working in an
unpleasant job, both effects work in the same direction.
The necessary conditions for a maximum of the utility maximization
problem (15) are:
a k~pc
- ~Z , ~Z 1 3
-b~pc ~U ~U
- - áz2 ~ az3.
(i6)
Notice that, since consumption is assumed to be a"good" (that is ~Z ~0),
3
b less than zero implies that Z2 is a"good", and b greater than zero
implies that Z2 is a"bad". This can also be seen in Figure 1, in which
the sf~ape of the budget set is shown for different values of b, in respec-
tively the (Z1,Z2)-plane, the (Z1,Z3)-plane and the (Z2,Z3)-plane, where
a'k)0 and pc-1.-8-
0
f'igi~re lA.'Chc ~~ntimum situation in the (Z3,Z1)
ple~~e, g~~~~~n a value of ZZ
Figure IEi.The opt.imum situation in the




E~igure 1C.The optimum situation in the
(ZZ,Z1)- plane,for e given
value oC Z3.
Figure 1. The budget set.-9-
In all these planes the budget line is a straight line. In the (Z1,Z3)-
plane the slope of the budget line is independent of the value of b. Dif-
fr,renl, values of b only yield different positions of the budget curve. In
hut.h uther planes, the slope of the budget line does depend on the value
of b. In the (Z2,Z3)-plane the slope of the budget line is negative for
neg~ttive values oF b, and positive for positive values. For b~0, the opti-
mum point is on the rising part of the indifference curve. For b-0, the
budg~~t line is horizontal; in this case the existence of a satiation point
of 7,2 is required. The same applies to the optimum situation in the
(Zi,'L2)-plane.
Following the approach taken by Pollak and Wachter(1975), we define a
cost function C(P,Z) as the cost of the least expensive bundle of goods,
required to produce the commodity vector Z-(Zi,Z2,Z3) when good prices are
P-(w.Pc)-
C(P,Z) :- -whtpcc
- - a'k.(T-Z1)-bZ2fpcZ3 . (18)
Implicit commodity prices n-(rti,n2,rr3) are defined as the marginal costs
of producing commodities:
ni(P.Z) - ~Z P Z - a'k
1
rr2(P.Z) - ~Z P Z - -b
2





Further, full implicit income ( I) is defined as the cost of the commodity
bundle Z, evaluated at the implicit commodity prices:
I(P,z) :- rtizi t n2z2 t rt3Z3 {22)
- u t a'k.T.-10-
Maximi~ation problem (15) can be rewritten as
max U(Z1,Z2,Z3)
s.t. nlzl t rr2z2 , rr3z3 - I(P,z) (23)
Since, in this case, the commodity prices are independent of the commodity
bundle chosen by the individual, the analogy with traditional demand
theory is preserved. Thus, we can proceed with the specification of the
indirect utility function.
For our specification of the indirect utility function we adopt a
variant. of the Hausman-Ruud model (cf. Hausman and Ruud[1984]):
.
V(n.i) - exP((~lnl } S2n2)~TT3)u (24)
u~ - I~rr3,8tólnl~rr3.b2n2~n3t1~2,ylrti~n3t1~2y2n2~n3 (z5)
Application of Roy's Identity yields demand functions for the commodities
Z:
r
Z1 - -~31u - ~1 - y1n1~R3 t T
~
Z2 - -p2u - ó2 - ~2R2~R3
(z6)
(z7)
z3 - (l~1Rl~n3t ~2n2~R3` 1)uM - 9 } 1~2~1n1~"3 } 1~2~2n2~"3 (28)
The price of consumption n3 is used as a numeraire.Translating system
(z6)-(28) back into the goods-space, the following goods demands functions
are derived:
.
h-~31J.i t bl t X1(a'k)
.
hq - -i32N - b2 t 712b







u - lAtgtbl(a~k)-ó2b}1,2~1 (32)
2.]. ia:timation
t~oticc~ that the above described system of goods demand functions is non-
l.inear; the nonli.nearity comes in in equation (30). In principle suc.h a
nonlinear system of demand equations can be estimated. However, in our
data-set the information about job characteristics is dichotomous ( e.g. a
certain job is reported to be dirty or not). Thus, for q we only have a
binary indicator. To estimate the model, we therefore need an explicit
expression for the probabilities that the binary indicator q is one or
zero. This, in turn, requires the reduced form of the system, which in
this case is quite straightforward. See Appendix A.
The necessary condition for a utility maximum is that the slope of the
indifference curve equals the slope of the budget constraint. Since the
implicit prices are independent of Z1,Z2, and Z3, the budget constraint is
linear, and the second order condition for a utility maximum is that the
indifference curves are convex. In Appendix A a condition for quasi-con-
cavity of the Hausman-Ruud direct utility function is given, (see also
Kapteyn, Kooreman and Van Soest [1986]) as well as a discussion of how
this can be checked in estimation.
Estimation of the reduced form parameters requires information on the
exogenous variables k and u, the endogenous variables c, h, q and all
(implicit) prices. Prices are functions of observables and unknown para-
meters which are estimated simultaneously with the system of demand func-
tlO11S .
We speciFy a stochastic version of the reduced For.m system by adding a
disturbance term to each equation. Due to the adding-up restriction one of
the Equations may be dropped in estimation. We drop the equation for con-
sumption and obtain all the parameter estimates from the other equations.
T~ deal with demographic variation we have parameterized ól as
bl - S10 } Sllfs f ó1zdchildó (33)
where fs .- log of family size
dchild6 :- dummy for the presence of children younger than six.-12-
Z'he exact specification of the wage equation is:
w- all } a12ed2
. a13ed3 t al~}ed4 t a21age
t a22ed2.age t a23ed3.age t a24ed4.age
4 a31age2 ta32ed2.age2 t a33ed3.age2
t a3~{ed4.age2 t a5for t bq
(34)
where ed2 .- 1 if the education level is 2
0 else
ed3 .- 1 if the education level is 3
0 else
ed4 .- 1 iF the education level is 4(highest)
0 else
for .- 1 if the individual's home country is
not Holland
0 else
Solving h, q, and w from (29)-(34) yields the reduced form solutions h, q,
and w(see Appendix A). Let h and w be the observed values of h and w and
let q be the binary indicator for q. Then we specify the Following
stochastic model for h,w and q:
h - h t Eh
W - W t E
W
q - q t E
q
q - 1 if q )0
0 if q ~0
Eh 0


















The likelihood contribution for working individuals with q- 1 is
fl(h,w). fc(q~ h.w)dq
0'







where fc is the conditional density of q, and fl the marginal density of h
and w. The likelihood for non-working individuals, for whom q and w are
not known is:
(43)
where f2 is the marginal density of h.
The model, developed above, is referred to as the "extended" model. We
will contrast the extended model with a"standard" model, describing the
case where q is excluded from the direct utility function, i.e. q is no
longer a choice variable, but enters exogenously into the wage equation.
Due to its mode of ineasurement, q is then taken as a binary variable. Then
the maximization problem becomes :
max u(c,l) (44)
s.t. pcc - w(T-1) t u. (45)







u~ - u t 9 t b1wlpc t 1I2~1(wlpc)Z
the following demand functions for h and c can be derived:
w
c-(Í31w t 1)u - 8 t lI2?Ilw
~





For tlie rest, the standard model is specified similar to the extended
model (equations (33)-(36)).-i5-
3. Empirical Results
in Appendix A the complete specification of the extended model and
standard model is given. We have considered only one job characteristic,
namely cleanliness of work. It is possible to extend the model by con-
sidering more job characteristics, but this is left for the future. The
model has been estimated by means of maximum likelihood for data from a
mobility survey in The Netherlands, conducted in 1985. The sample con-
tained 932 males in families, of which 884 are working and 48 are not
worki.ng. Sample information is given in Table 1. From this table it can be
seen that ~j~ of the males report to work in clean jobs. Notice that non-
labour income also includes labour income of the spouse.
The first column of Table 2 shows results for an Ordinary Least Squares
Regression of wages on a vector of human capital variables, on a dummy
variable "foreigner" and on a dummy variable for the job characteristic
cleanliness of work. The dummy equals one if the work is reported by the
individual to be clean, and zero otherwise, which means that the job char-
acteristic is defined to be a"good". The results of the maximum likeli-
hood estimation of the standard and the extended model are presented in
tYie other two columns of Table 2. As was discussed in Section 2, job
choice was assumed to be exogenous in the standard model. This model con-
sists of two equations, an hours equation and a wage equation. In the
extei~ded model job choice was made endogenous, thus extending the model
with a job choice equation.
The coefficient of the job characteristic (b) in the OLS-regression is
0.01 and in the standard model -0.11. Although the specification of the
wage equation is identical for the standard model and the single wage
equation model, the estimates differ for two reasons. First, the estima-
tion methods differ (OLS versus SURE). Secondly, the OLS-regression has
only been done for working individuals (without correction for selection
bias). As in much empirical research on wage differentials the estimated
wage difference is very small and statistically not significant. According
to the theory of compensating wage differentials, one would expect a nega-
tive sign for this coefficient. However it could be argued that the coef-
ficietit should not be interpreted as a compensating wage differential, but-~6-
as a measure of the impact of omitted variables, such as ability and moti-
vation. Whatever the interpretation, the two estimates of this coefficient
ar~e biased iF one believes that the job characteristic is an endogenous
variable. In the extended model the interpretation of the wage differen-
tial is different, since b is the coefficient of the latent variable q and
not of the observed variable q A reasonable measure of the wage differen-
tial migt~t be
(E(q~q-1) - F.(q~qo-0)).b - 6.02 guilders per hour.
Figure 2 presents, for the different models, wages as a function of
age, for different levels of education. As one can see from this figure,
age has a positive but decreasing effect on wages, for all levels of edu-
cation. The higher the level of education the steeper the curve. With
respect to the wage curves, all three models look very similar.
Turning to the economic interpretation of the other parameters in the
last two columns one should bear in mind that the extended model is non-
linear and that the estimated parameters are just particular parameters of
the utility function and of the budget constraint. For simplicity we will
nevertheless mainly use conventional terminology to describe the para-
meters. In both the standard and ttie extended model family size has a
negative, though insignificant effect on the male's labour supply (b11C0).
On the other hand, the more children younger than six there are, the
higher is the male's labour supply (this effect is also insignificant)
(512)0). In all three models being a foreigner has a negative, though
insignificant effect.
Furthermore, we notice that both last columns show negative income effects
on labnur supply (g1C0). The income effect on the demand for the job char-
acteristic, -(3z, is positive, as one would expect since individuals with a
high income can best afford nonpecuniary job characteristics.
With respect to the standard model and the extended model, we should
note that for numerical reasons the models have been reparameterized. We
have estimated directly the constant term, the linear wage coefficient and
the quadratic wage coefficient of the hours equation and the constant term
in the job characteristic equation. For the exact specification, see Ap-
pendix A. Thus, we circumvented the numerical problem of identifying 8,
when ~l is small. The linear wage effect is negative and insignificant in
the standard model (-0.49), but positive in the extended model (0.59). The-1~-
quadratic wage coefficient is positive in the standard model and negative
in the extended model. In Figure 3 the labour supply curves for both
mc,~1~~15 are shown.-t8-
fable 1 Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations of Variables used in
the Analysis
Uariable Definition Mean (Standard Deviation)
working not working all
clean dirtY
clean :-1 if the job is
clc~an
o eise 1 0 - 0.73(0.45)
h:- worki.ng hours 42.5(7.8) 42.8(7.7) 0 40.4(12.1)
w :- after Lax wage
~
rate 16.2(6.7) 16.1(6.1) - 16.2(6.5)
u:- non-labour income 219(243) 203(216) 501(188) 230(242)
ed2 :- 1 if education
0











for :- 1 if Foreigner
0.19(0.39) 0.22(0.42) 0.31(0.47) 0.20(0.40)
0.39(0.49) 0.38(0.49) 0-25(0.44) 0.38(0.49)
0.27(0.48) 0.23(0.42) 0.15(0.36) 0.25(0-43)
39.4(l0.1) 39.5(9.8) 41.5(10.0) 39-5(l0-0)
o else o.o5(o.z3) 0.03(0.18) 0.13(0.33) 0.o6(o.z5)
fs :- log of family






o else o.29(0.45) 0.32(0.47) 0.02(0.14) 0.28(0.45)
number of observations 641 243 48 932
~:- These numbers apply to working males only.-19-
'I'aF,le Z k'ac~:~meter Estimates (Standard Errors in parentheses)
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Figure 3. Male labour supply curves.-23-
11. Con~.lusion
We have estimated a simultaneous model of job choice, labour supply
and wages. Two main conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, nonpecu-
niary ,job characteristics (in this paper we have only analysed cleanliness
of work) are important determinants of labour supply and wages. Second,
the model yields estimation results that differ in sign and in magnítude
from results obtained for models that do not take into account the endoge-
neity of job choice. Therefore, analyses of labour supply and wages that
ignore the (self) selection of individuals into different occupations, may
produce misleading results.
There are a few limitations to this analysis that deserve attention.
First, the simple specification of the production function of job charac-
teristics needs improvement. In particular we are considering a specifica-
tion in which the production of job characteristics also depends on the
number of hours one has to be on the job. The underlying idea is that it
is worse to do dirty work for forty hours per week than for ten. Second,
we have analysed only one job characteristic, while in this model it seems
possible to analyse a number of job characteristics simultaneously.
Despite these limitations, it appears that the results so far justify
Further research of simultaneuos models of job choice, labour supply and
wages.-24-
Appendix A. Derivation of the reduced form and some theoretical implica-
tions of utility maximization.
In this Appendix, first the exact specifications of the standard model and
the extended model will be given, that are used for estimation. Next some
theoretical implications of utility maximization are discussed.
Let us start with the exact specification of the standard model, that
consists of a wage equation and a labour supply equation:
.
h - p1N fbl ~~lw. (A.1)
w- a' k t bq
where u~ - N t J t ólw t 1~2y1(w)2
a'k - all } a12ed2
t a13ed3 t a14ed4 t a21age
t a22ed2.age t a23ed3.age t a24ed4.age
. a31age2 3a32ed2.age2 t a33ed3.age2
t a34ed4.age2 t a5for
S1 - ~10 } bllfs t b12dchildó
and q exogenous.
We have rewritten equation (A.1) as follows:
h- cl t c2w f c3w2 ; plu t bi t plbiw
where cl - ~1~ } b10








c3 - -0.5~1~1 (A-9)-25-
bl - bllfs
t b12dchild6 (A.10)
Next. we tiirn to the extended model. In section 2, the demand equations
for the goods c.h, and q are derived from a variant of the Hausman-Ruud
indirect, utility function (equations (29)-(32)).
reducr,d form of the model can be obtained :
- ~
h- plu t bl t yl(a'k)
, w ~
9 - (-H2u - b2 t ?l2b)~ h
w- a' k t bq
u~ - ut8tb1(a'k)-b2bt1~2y1(a'k)2t1~2~2b2





h- dl . d2a'k t d3(a'k)2 t~lu t glbla'k t bl (A.15)
q - d4 - )32N - ~32b1a'k - 0.5~1(a'k)2~h (A.16)
wliere dl - j31(g - b2b t
0.5Y2b2) } b10




d4 --P2(8 - b2b 4 0.5~2b2) - b2 t,y2b ÍA.20)
Since the budget constraint is linear, a sufficient condition for a
utility maximum is concavity of the direct utility function. This is equi-
vale~lt with the condition for a cost minimum, namely concavity of the cost
function. The cost function corresponding to the indirect Hausman-Ruud
utility funcY.ion is
From these equations the
C(n) - u.exp(-J3'n) - 9- b'n - 1~2rt'An (A.21)-26-
where u denotes the individual's utility level. In this notation the price
of consumption is set equal to one.
In t.he standard model ~3,n, and A are scalars,namely:
p :- A1
A :- ~1
rr :- a' k t bq
In the extended model ~ and rt are two-dimensional vectors and A is a 2x2
diagoiial matrix.
rt : - ( rt~ 1
Concavity of the cost function requires that
E :- (u } g } S'rt ; 1~2rt'Art)~~' - A (A.22)
is negative semi-definite. Since, however, a consideration of (A.17)-
(A.20) shows that b2 is not identified, the concavity condition cannot
(and does not have to) be imposed in estimation.-27-
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